AN ORAL HISTORY OF THE WINFIELD DUNN ADMINISTRATION INTERVIEWS WITH LEONARD BRADLEY

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
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AN ORAL HISTORY OF THE WINFIELD DUNN ADMINISTRATION

INTERVIEWS WITH LEONARD BRADLEY

JUNE 8, 1977

BY CHARLES W. CRAWFORD

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ORAL HISTORY RESEARCH OFFICE

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PLACE Nashville, TN.

DATE June 8, 1977.

Leonard K. Bradley Jr.
(Interviewee)

Charles W. Crawford
(For the Mississippi Valley Archives of the John Willard Brister Library of Memphis State University)

(OHRO Form B)

THIS IS THE ORAL HISTORY RESEARCH OFFICE OF MEMPHIS STATE UNIVERSITY. THE PROJECT IS THE "ORAL HISTORY OF THE WINFIELD DUNN ADMINISTRATION." THE PLACE IS NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE AND THE DATE IS JUNE 8, 1977. THE INTERVIEW IS WITH MR. LEONARD K. BRADLEY. THE INTERVIEW IS BY DR. CHARLES W. CRAWFORD, DIRECTOR OF THE MEMPHIS STATE UNIVERSITY ORAL HISTORY RESEARCH OFFICE. TRANSCRIBED BY BETTY WILLIAMS. INTERVIEW # I.

DR. CRAWFORD: Mr. Bradley, I suggest we start with some biographical information about you, and then we will proceed with your first contact with the Dunn administration.

MR. BRADLEY: I am just going to read from a vita which begins my masters thesis. I was born August 12, 1940 at Lebanon, Tennessee, where I lived all of my life until entering the army and college. I attended elementary schools in Lebanon and graduated from Castle Heights Military Academy where my father was headmaster. I attended Cumberland University in Lebanon for a year, entered the army for three years and then returned to school at UT-Knoxville, where I received a Bachelor's degree in Political Science and a Master's degree in Political Science. While I was in school in Knoxville for five years I worked as a copy editor for the Knoxville New-Sentinel full time. After finishing school I joined the staff of the Tennessee Office of Urban and Federal Affairs in February of 1968. I served as a program analyst, a division director, and a

grant review coordinator for federal programs. And then I was appointed director of Urban and Federal Affairs by Governor Ellington in August of 1970 shortly before the end of that administration. While in the office of Urban and Federal Affairs I served for two months as a full-time consultant to the U.S. Office of Management and Budget on a grant and aid simplification project.

I'd returned to Nashville before the end of the Ellington administration to become director of Urban and Federal Affairs, and was in that position during December of '71 when Governor Dunn appointed me special assistant for policy planning. I served on various government advisory boards as advisor to various government-related organizations-as president of the Southern Conference of Federal and State Coordinators for a year, as a chairman of the Tennessee Man-Hour Coordinating Committee and various other organizations.

I married Margaret Sue Walls of Lebanon and I have two children, Timothy and Alice.

Do you wish me to proceed now on?

DR. CRAWFORD: Yes, will you please continue now through your first contact with the Dunn Administration and get into your work there.

MR. BRADLEY: May I preface that by or set the stage by pointing out that my involvement with the Dunn Administration began while I was in the Ellington administration; and my first contact with the Dunn administration was in connection, in fact, with the transition between Ellington and Dunn. Really,

there are four aspects to what I wish to report on: The first has to do with the way that the transition between those administrations was conducted. Because I think it was very germane to the way and to the tone or the attitude that the Dunn administration adopted toward state employees in general and its overall task. The second aspect would be my involvement in the reorganization of the central staff services of the governor's offices such as State Planning and other management offices which the governor has at his direct disposal and the executive office. The third thing being the decision of Governor Dunn to attempt to really bring to bear on state government, which is rather stodgy and beareauacratic, pressures to implement and fund programs of special interest to him. The fourth aspect is that I was in charge and my office was involved in the development of Governor Dunn's legislative program each year. So there are those four aspects.

My first involvement with Governor Dunn came about through Governor Ellington's decision, primarily at the instance of S. H. Roberts, Jr., "Bo" Roberts, of Knoxville who was on his staff. This decision of Governor Ellington during the primary campaign of 1970 that whoever was elected--Republican or Democrat--and I suppose he expected a Democrat to be elected-he would provide a formal program of assistance to the new administrarion orientation which would proceed between the election in early November and the inauguration in January. Bo Roberts and Governor Ellington assigned to my office, which at that time was the Office of Urban and Federal Affairs, responsibility for planning and organizing a transition effort from the prospective of the Ellington

administration. Now of course, I would say that the transition effort which Governor Dunn's staff organized under the direction of Lamar Alexander was of greater importance, of course, because the incoming administration and Ellington administration as the outgoing administration simply wished to provide whatever degree of assistance that it could.

The Office of Urban and Federal Affairs staff worked for months, I suppose, during July, August, September, October, of 1970 to collect information from state agencies in fairly detailed questionaires about what problems existed in those agencies with respect to serving people, personnel problems, and problems with statutes and regulations which would need to be addressed early on in the administration.

For instance, this is just an example. One of the kinds of problems identified was that it was pretty well-known late in the Ellington administration that we were going to face a problem with prospective strikes by prison guards. There was a considerable movement toward unionization. Those kinds of problems were identified for the Dunn administration to anticipate. Many of the problems materialized, such as the prison guard's strike at Brushy Mountain which resulted in the closing down of Brushy Mountain by Governor Dunn, and many of the problems didn't materialize.

But at any rate, the transition effort of the Ellington administration was to try to carry out what Ellington's stated intention was to provide as smooth as possible transition. Ellington had almost

twenty years of experience in state government and had seen it grow from a very small budget in which the governor could almost single-handedly run state government, with the assistance of maybe one assistant, to a situation in which the state appropriations were around a billion dollars. The size of federal programs had grown from perhaps thirty or forty major programs which the state was administering to more than 100 which the state was administering. [There was,] in many respects, the growth of the Republican Party and the growing separation between the executive and the legislative branches.

For many reasons Ellington appeared to sincerely feel that his successor was going to need all the help he could get on the front end. I think, in fact, after the primary election it was obvious that his successor in office, whether it was John J. Hooker or Winfield Dunn, was going to be a man with no experience in government--absolutely none. That would be the first time since Frank Clement's first election that there would be a governor with no experience in government.

From that perspective, as it turned out in fact, there was a party with almost no experience in government elected--the Republican Party. But at any rate, the research that we did with state agencies over a period of several months--and there were seven or eight of us working on collecting this material--we reduced to a briefing booklet. We had arranged prior to the election in November with the staffs of both nominees to present this briefing material in a one-and-a-half-day seminar at Montgomery Bell State Park. We took them away from Nashville and away from the hubbub and so forth. We did, in fact, arrange that

immediately after the election with Lamar Alexander.

DR. CRAWFORD: Was that in November?

MR. BRADLEY: That was in November. That was, as I recall, November 4, 1970.

DR. CRAWFORD: Who made the arrangements?

MR. BRADLEY: The arrangements were made initially--the arrangement to provide assistance--was conveyed by Bo Roberts of the Ellington staff in a letter to Gil Merritt, who was Hooker's campaign manager and to Lamar Alexander who was Dunn's campaign manager. Both Lamar and Gil immediately acknowledged the letter and said they would be interested in a formal program of this assistance and that they would be getting together the governor's principal advisors if not the governor--elect himself immediately after the election to try to iron some of these matters out.

I detailed those kinds of arrangements in my master's thesis which I have here and which you may want to refer to. For instance, if you wish I will read into your record the names of the people who had the initial first meeting with Ellington's staff the day after the election.

DR. CRAWFORD: That would be helpful.

MR. BRADLEY: If you will give me a moment to find that. The election, I believe, was on November 3th 1970. Governor Dunn did meet with Governor Ellington personally on November 5th, a few days after the election, and by that time Ellington told and recalled to Dunn that their two staffs had been making these arrangements for intensive collaboration. And Dunn was told

by Ellington that their two staffs were getting together later that day, November 5th, to try to schedule certain events that would have to take place.

The three key campaign staff members who represented the governor-elect at this first meeting with Ellington's staff were Lamar Alexander, who was campaign manager, Tom Garland who was state senator from Greeneville who had served full time on the primary campaign staff and David White, who was director of research and speech writing for Governor Dunn, and Bo Roberts and me on that day. Only a very few matters were discussed.

The briefing schedule for the orientation session for Montgomery Bell Park was one. Roberts and I reminded Alexander the major appointments the Governor would have to proceed to make. We detailed, at that time, physical arrangements that had been made in preparation of a suite of offices for the governor-elect to use during the time of transition period. We refurbished an office in the old state office building ajacent to the capitol for the governor personally and also for his staff. We emphasized to the importance of their getting ready right away upon the matter of preparing their budget, which would have to be submitted to the General Assembly during March. This was in November that we were speaking of. In fact, the budget preparations were already under way by the old administration. The new administration at that point began working on the budget in tandem. That really was all that transpired on that first meeting.

I might read into the record as well the people whom Dunn sent to

this briefing at Montgomery Bell State Park on November 13 and 14, of 1970. That was a Friday and Saturday. We met, I guess, half a day Friday and intended to meet all day Saturday, but people sort of got worn out by the middle of the day on Saturday, so we adjourned at 2 or 3 o'clock. People whom Dunn sent to that first meeting were most of his key people during his campaign, most of whom would stay on during the administration and all of whom, even those who didn't join the administration, continued a strong close advisorship to Dunn throughout the Dunn administration.

Those persons attending the meeting were: Harry Wellford, who had been his primary election campaign manager and who is a judge in Memphis. And James McGhee, a Memphis mortgage banker, and served as a treasurer during the general election campaign Louis Donelson, Memphis attorney and authority on finance and taxation who continued to be a close advisor to Dunn--probably closest in my view. Lee Smith, who served in several capacities on Dunn's staff and emerged as the executive assistant and chief-of-staff of the administration of the governor's office. Frank Barnett, who worked in the governor's campaign heading the governor's personnel operations during the transition and who was appointed Governor Dunn's first executive assistant. Howard Kesley, who served as a campaign advisor from Knox County and had been involved for a long time in Knox County politics and who ultimately was named commissioner of General Services. David White attended the meeting. David was chief of research and speech writing in the campaign organization, but he did not stay with

the administration but returned to private business in Knoxville. Robin Beard, who had been a field director in parts of the old Third, Fourth and Fifth and Sixth Congressional Districts and served as Commissioner of Personnel for Dunn. He organized certain aspects of the transition which had to do with the ceremonial aspects. He resigned to run for Congress in 1972 where he still serves the new Sixth District. Roger Kesley, son of Howard Kesley, was a full time staffer and advance man during Dunn's campaign. He was at this Montgomery Bell meeting. Roger became a staff assistant to the governor with primary responsibilities initially during the first legislative session for coordinating the legislative program and thereafter handling the appointments of 800 boards and commissions to which the governor was responsible for making appointments. Roger also came to handle probation and parole cases. He is now resigned to run Tom Garland's unsuccessful campaign to be elected to the Public Service Commission. Following that unsuccessful campaign he opened a Nashville branch of Howard Baker's old Knoxville law firm, the Crossley Law Firm. Bob Eckles attended the meeting. He was a Nashville attorney who served as executive director of the Nashville operations during Dunn's general election campaign. Bob returned to the law practice in Nashville after the transition period. Lamar Alexander had left the White House staff to manage Dunn's general election campaign. Lamar had worked for Bryce Harlow, who handled the Congressional liaison for the Nixon White House. Prior to Lamar's White House assignment he had been administrative assistant and chief aide to

Howard Baker. He also served in Richard Nixon's first Washington campaign organization. I don't mean first, I mean first successful campaign. Lamar had been involved heavily in operating the Johnson/Nixon transition program. I think he brought a special knowledge to the Ellington/Dunn transition effort by virtue of that involvement. He since has entered a law practice in Nashville and has run once unsuccessfully for governor. Those are the people who Dunn sent to represent him as his primary advisors in that first extensive contact with the Ellington Administration.

I might say briefly, and then leave this subject, the briefing and the 250 page manual which we (the Ellington Administration) prepared for the Dunn administration was the first formalized effort at trying this in Tennessee. Really probably it was the first time it had been necessary for reasons I mentioned previously. There had been leap frog government for a few years and the government had gotten a little more complicated.

As a result of that effort and having been pleased with it, Dunn determined that he would offer the same degree of assistance to whomever his successor was. In fact, again at the end of the Dunn administration he appointed me and some of the same people who had been involved in the Ellington/Dunn transition to organize such a transition from Dunn to Blanton. We made the same gestures and notifications of the Blanton and the Alexander campaign offices that Ellington had made for Dunn and Hooker. We got the same sort of acknowledgement and lo and behold after the election we met once with some of Governor Blanton's staff and they were interested almost exclusively in political matters.

They were interested in getting data processing print-outs of all state employees and state addresses, length of employment, when they had been employed, things like the records who had special parking privileges around the capital hill. My assessment of that was they were trying to identify those closely associated with Dunn who had special privileges. We declined to give them certain information which would facilitate head-hunting and gave them certain others of public record, employment print-out; that stacked five feet high on the floor of all state employees and their home addresses and their length of employment, which probably were of record. Other than that, the Blanton administration was just totally disinterested in any sort of orientation in any kind of assistance. The impression that the Dunn administration of that was that they were just interested in running their own thing. Which was fine. He had been elected overwhelmingly and we did not want to impose on him. Nevertheless, the Dunn administration to this day, the Ellington/Dunn transition to this day, stands as the only example of collaboration and cooperation between an incoming and out-going administration.

Perhaps even more remarkable, it was the first such change of party in fifty years. My personal view is that that although Ellington was prepared to offer that assistance to Hooker from discussions with members of Ellington's staff and having known them and worked with them--my impression is that some of the people on Ellington's staff and perhaps Ellington himself were, in fact, more willing to cooperate once Dunn was elected. There was an extreme amount of animosity

between some of Hooker's people and some of Ellington's people because Hooker tried to dislodge Ellington and tried to defeat him in Ellington's last race for governor. There were some extremely bad feelings between some of those people.

I might point out, just because some question might arise, that personal relations between Bo Roberts, who was Governor Ellington's primary program and policy advisor and between Gil Merritt, who was Hooker's primary advisor--personal relationships between those two people were very cordial and I think, they had a long standing personal relationship. I don't want to reflect upon their personal relationship, but nevertheless, I have good reason to believe and good reason to know that there were some people in the Ellington administration who were glad to see Dunn's election over Hooker and they, I suppose, would be hard-pressed to have some of those people to identify themselves. Many of them have been life-long Democrats and have worked ardently for the Democratic Party.

That transition, I think, at least set a style as Ellington went out of office having devoted almost all of his adult lift to state government service. It set a tone in the way he went out. I know for a fact in his private remarks about Ellington and his private thoughts about Ellington that he expressed to his advisors that Governor Dunn continues to have utmost regard for Ellington. In my close association with Governor Dunn over that period of four years, I never once heard him even in private make an unkind remark about Ellington or to doubt Ellington's motives on any matter or sincerity. He just had the utmost

regard for Ellington--a great deal of it having to do with the attitude that Ellington brought into that transition. He could have made it very difficut. He could have cut off access to state agencies during that transition period very easily had he wanted to, but Ellington bent over backwards to do the opposite.

I think those are some of the aspects of the transition between administrations. These are most important to me personally as far as my personal dealings with Dunn goes and it was important from the standpoint of that is the way I got to know Dunn during the transition and through working with Dunn's staff.

And you could tell at the beginning that some of Governor Dunn's staff-- young folks, Republicans--were perhaps very briefly somewhat suspicious of the Ellington administration. Why would the Ellington administration want to offer this kind of assistance to a new Republican order? But I think very quickly they dropped their guard. In fact, Ellington told Dunn that these people on the transition staff--these six or seven or eight people--were just Dunn's and he ought to work them during the transition period in whatever capacity he wanted.

As a result the people on the transition staff of Ellington's ended up working with Lee Smith during the transition to, in fact, write most of Dunn's important legislation which Dunn submitted to the 1971 session of the legislature. Lee Smith worked with the transition staff to identify programs which Dunn had espoused during the campaign--drug abuse, state-wide free kindergartens, penal reform, improvement of

mental health facilities, education and a few areas like that. We went to work, side by side, with Dunn's staff to develop legislation and budget programs in those areas.

As a result, the most significant legislation that was written and passed by the Dunn administration during the first session of the legislature--I think anyone of Dunn's people had been involved in that like Lee Smith would-- confirm that the basic legislative program of the Dunn administration was developed by people who were in the employ of the Ellington administration like me and others who were working with us.

It really seemed remarkable to me then and it does now that it was simply an indication that Dunn and his staff really did take face value Ellington's stated intent to provide whatever degree of assistance to facilitate the transition. I'm not sure what difference it made ultimately. It may not take long for a new governor to get his feet on the ground and grab hold of the reins anyway. But I am sure it facilitated things during the transition and a few months thereafter that Ellington had offered that kind of assistance.

I believe that really unless you have questions, is all I want to observe about the transition. I have a great deal more information about that if you wish to pursue it. In fact, as I mentioned, I documented that and much more of the detail of how the transition proceeded in a master's thesis which will be available if it is of any use to you.

DR. CRAWFORD: Who was the director?

MR. BRADLEY: The director of the transition?

DR. CRAWFORD: No, of the thesis.

MR. BRADLEY: The thesis director was Nelson M. Robinson, my major professor in the Political Science Department at U.T. Other members of the committee were: Lee Greene, former department head there, T. McNader Simpson, also a political scientist at U.T.

DR. CRAWFORD: And that is available in the University of Tennessee Library?

MR. BRADLEY: Yes, it is. I'll be glad to furnish you a copy if you wish. It is available there and also available in State Library in Nashville and in Library of the State Planning Office in Nashville.

DR. CRAWFORD: That would be very helpful, I think, on the subject of transitions.

Let's get on then to the next phase of your work.

MR. BRADLEY: Okay. I believe the way I would like to approach the discussion of the next phase is to say that it will be generally the way that Dunn came to use staff in the Executive Office of the Governor and the shortcomings and to reorganize the various staff agencies that are associated with the governor's office.

At the time that Dunn came into office and organized his staff he had of course, his personal staff of about five or six people like Ralph Griffith, Joe Hopper, Frank Barnett, Lee Smith and Dale Young

performing fairly traditional functions that are performed by a governor's personal staff. Then there were two previously existing staff divisions of the governor's office. The State Planning Office, although it was not legally attached to the governor's office, the staff in fact was easily accessible to the governor and at times was used as if it was the governor's executive staff. The State Planning Office existed as the Tennessee State Planning Commission and actually was under the jurisdiction of a board of citizens. I think eight citizen members were appointed by the governor.

The second division was the Office of Urban and Federal Affairs which Governor Ellington established late in 1967 to try to cope with the increasing maze of federal/state relationships, state and local government relationships, congressional matters and things of that sort.

When Dunn came into office, there was absolutely no turnover. Well, I take that back. There was one person in the Office of Urban and Federal Affairs who left at that time, but all other persons in this office, a staffed division of the governor's office and I, remained as director. Dunn asked me to stay on as director. In fact, he apologized for not announcing that he was appointing me director because of the possible political repercussions--Republicans all over the state wanting positions and jobs and he didn't want to point out the fact that he was asking someone who was ostensibly a Democrat from the Ellington administration to stay on. My staff and I stayed on almost to a man and he came to rely on us in matters that had absolutely nothing to do with federal or local relations. He relied on us for researching the various

issues, for handling crisis situations that might arise such as trying to resolve the prison guard's strike that developed early in the Dunn administration.

Now in the middle of the first year of the Dunn administration it was apparent that Urban and Federal Affairs in fact was no longer that. We were not able to devote sufficient attention to federal/state and local matters, but were having to devote more of our attention to personal assistance to the governor and his personal staff and had nothing to do with those other matters. That problem arose and it was undermining our effectiveness in coping with what we were supposed to do in Urban and Federal Affairs.

And at the same time, although Dunn had a pretty good year with the legislature that first year, in fact, he got all of his major bills through the legislature in the 1971 session and he got half the state taxes he asked for--I think the half cent or one cent he asked for--he realized here he was governor, who thought he could come in and reorder things and he'd have this two billion dollar budget to work on and he found out pretty quickly that a governor really can't do all that much to impact the state budget. And he felt that if he was really going to have an impact on state government he needed to reorganize in some way to cope with the system, to work his way into the system.

As a result he had some of us--I was not yet on Dunn's staff--Lee Smith on his staff; his Commissioner of Finance and Administration Russell Hippe; the director of the state planning office, Tilden Curry; and I, who was director of Urban and Federal Affairs, give some thought

to a possible reorganization to staff agencies around the governor's office. He also called in as consultants a team of people supplied by the Council of State Governments at Lexington, Kentucky, and that team was composed of people actually working in state government. The council pulled in Dick Slaypin on the staff of the governor of the state of Washington, who now is dead; Ed Temple who is head Commissioner of Administration or Secretary of Administration in Virginia; Frank Patilina, who is state planning director in Illinois and a member of the Staff of the Council State Governments. Those people came to Nashville and worked for about a week with us examining the way the governor's staff functioned, the way it related to other state agencies, the way it related to the Legislature, the ways these various staff agencies related to each other.

They concluded that the governor's staff was just not organized efficiently to perform its present functions or to enable the governor to really have a great impact on state government. They speculated in their report to Governor Dunn that probably the governor cannot count on really directing the expenditure or influencing expenditure of more than 10 or 15 percent of all state money. You know that a half billion dollars is going to have to go every year to support through 12 education and higher education and that money is just not available for other purposes--not available for diversion. You know that the chuck holes in the roads are going to have to be filled, that the interstate is going to have to be completed. There are so many things that are going to be done in the same way no matter whether the governor is Hooker or Dunn

or whoever.

And they concluded, and the governor agreed ultimately, that if he really was going to have an influence, if he was going to be able to force through the legislature his program of kindergarten which would cost, at the time, the estimate was 17 million dollars a year. He was going to have to take on legislators who were beholden to the TEA, who would prefer to see that money go into salary increases for teachers already on the payroll. He was going to have to take on the system to force that through. He was going to have to have people who would devote their energies to developing to a new program--a program development office or a policy planning office. So out of all that consideration Dunn did, in fact, reorganize the central staff services.

This at the time did not involve any shifting of responsibilities of his personal staff. But it did involve returning the office of Urban and Federal Affairs to devote its full energies to its former responsibilities and creating a new office of Policy Planning which I was appointed the head of as special assistant to the governor, and also proposing to the Legislature that the old Tennessee State Planning Commission be abolished and that State Planning Office be attached directly to the Governor's office clearly as a staff arm of the governor.

All those things were done and the Legislature concurred in them so that we have Urban and Federal Affairs now. This was October, 1971, or November, when these changes were ordered. We had the Office of Urban and Federal Affairs doing basically what they had done during the Ellington administration, that is policy analysis of federal/state

issues and personal liaison with the Council of State Governments and other interstate governmental groups and grantmanship. The Office of Policy Planning which I headed, which was established to try to identify areas of primary interest to the governor--that is, those things that this governor wanted to do that some other governor might not want to--those things that would leave a personal imprint of Winfield Dunn on state government. That is, this office was set up to identify those priorities and try to implement through budget and legislation--trying to implement those kinds of programs.

Another major aspect of the work of the Office of Policy Planning was to work with state agencies to develop the legislative program each year, that is to say, yes, we will proceed with these others. Then, [we were] to assist Lee Smith and Jim Caldwell on the governor's staff in lobbying those bills through the legislature--providing information to legislators about the programs the governor was proposing and things of that sort.

The third aspect of the reorganization had to do with passing of the State Planning Office to the governor's office directly and we had quite a bit of trouble deciding exactly what the relationship between the policy planning staff and the state planning office would be. But ultimately, [we] decided that if the state were to continue to have a state planning office to look at long range planning--that is, not just this administration--but long range planning and to work with the state agencies on their own functional planning--for instance, recreation planning and the conservation department--that we must keep the state

planning office entirely non-political and insulated to some extent from the political activities of the governor's office or those activities that were identified personally with the governor.

So those three agencies were established or reestablished in the case of urban and federal affairs, and beginning about the end of Dunn's first year and for the next three years I served on Dunn's personal staff and my involvement in the administration from that point on related only to the duties of the Policy Planning Office. I think that ends what I feel I need to say about the reorganization of staff services. Unless there are questions that you have, there is an outgrowth of that I want to pursue. [It is] the way Dunn went about identifying what his goals and objectives would be, the kind of people he consulted, the process we went through, and what those goals were and whether they were accomplished. Now you may have questions before I get to that or may not.

DR CRAWFORD: Let's proceed to your next activity and then we'll come back and ask some questions about the personal staff--the size of it and the effectiveness of it and so forth.

MR. BRADLEY: Okay, for that purpose I would just like to say that about the time, and it was just not coincidental, that Dunn decided on this reorganization of staff agencies, he called a meeting of some of his primary advisors at the governor's mansion. The first meeting was on October 4, 1971, to discuss exactly where the administration was heading. He was one-fourth through the

administration. He had recognized, as I have previously mentioned, that the administration could just rock along with no particular objective in sight unless it decided exactly what it was it wanted to do. He knew that from statements he had made in his campaign and sincerely though what his personal interests were, what he had stated that he hoped to do in a general way, but exactly how do you go about that? Is it really reasonable as he had said in the campaign to think that you could or the state could afford a kindergarten program statewide? Is it really reasonable to think that a state can afford to put millions of dollars into improvement of mental health facilities? In order to try to identify what those various options were, he called this meeting on October 4, 1971, a meeting involving these people: Louis Donelson, who was not associated officially with the administration, but who at that time and throughout the administration was a very close advisor; Lamar Alexander; Leonard Dunavant, at that time a Republican representative from Memphis representing Millington who now is a state senator; Russell Hippe, who was Commissioner of Finance and Administration, a Nashville attorney now; Lee Smith, who at the time was the governor's legal counsel; Ralph Griffith and I. I was present as well. Griffith was Dunn's press secretary.

We discussed in a very general way the different kinds of matters which seemed too superficial at first to merit detailed consideration. Some of the things the Governor mentioned in starting the meeting were he was interested in the governor's cost control study headed by Maxey Jarman which was a privately organized and privately financed

examination by businessmen of state government. He was interested in higher education governance ; the tax program; creating a department of transportation out of our Highway Department and other agencies. He was interested in its relationship with college students in establishing an annual tourist conference; statewide kindergarten; a study of economic development of Tennessee; and initiating some kind of regionalized correctional program--getting away from the large centralized facilities. He was interested in a classification or evaluation of the inmates at the state prisons and accrediting all the state mental hospitals; he was interested in approving or examining the methods in which highways were programmed and planned and accelerating the financing of highways. And then some reforms of drug abuse. These are the matters that the governor mentioned at the beginning. The discussion at the mansion that day revolved around those and other suggestions.

It was Leonard Dunavant who finally suggested, "Well, as we try to determine what we ought to do, we ought to keep in mind several criteria for an evaluation of these objectives. And that is--is what is being proposed really practical--that is, can you reasonably expect to accomplish it? Is it reasonable to expect you might have statewide kindergarten by the end of the administration?" So, is it practical? was his first criteria. Is it popular politically or benefits widespread? Those were the three criteria that everyone agreed that those were good from the Governor's standpoint, from a political standpoint and from a practical standpoint. Those were the consider-

ations that we ought to have in mind as we considered these various objectives. So in this survey and in an attempt to determine what ought to be done, how the administration ought to focus its attention, I guess that discussion that day went on for two or three hours. The Governor decided that the Policy Planning staff ought to survey all state agencies to determine what his state agency commissioners were saying which was really important to do. That is, "Commissioner Armour, what is your primary objective or what are your primary objectives?"

In fact, we did solicit those suggestions and had responses from all the commissioners. I think the memorandum which was actually signed by Lee Smith went out to the departments on October 8th, 1971. Which I think was just briefly after our meeting of October 4th. We also got preliminary written thoughts from those people that attended the October 4th meeting from Lamar Alexander, Louis Donelson, Leonard Dunavant and the others.

We compiled a list as a summary of the recommendations of all those answering in advice to the governor and department heads as to what they thought would be important. We evaluated it statistically. We assigned weights as to how many people thought kindergarten was important and how many people thought certain other things were important. In that way we compiled a list for the governor which was gone over in a subsequent meeting by these same (Oct. 4th) advisors. And we determined, "Yes, it appears that there is pretty full agreement on some of these and there is not on others."

That discussion and further consultation with the governor's

commissioners resulted in the identification by Governor Dunn on May 23, 1972, of five areas of primary concern for the administration. The Governor with his eyes wide open clearly identified the areas in which he wanted to try to develop initiatives in which he wanted to funnel any money available beyond any normal continuation funding of state government. I will mention those five areas in a minute. Before I get to that I want to point out at least one peculiar thing about the programs or objectives that these advisors pointed out.

One in particular, the one person reporting as a result of that October 4 meeting and he recommended it very strongly that the governor support the conversion of all state agencies to civil service--that is, classified civil service in which employees would be protected from political politics and would not be hired on a political basis--was Lamar Alexander. Now Lamar, of that group had been the one most closely involved with Governor Dunn over a long period of time, even more closely than Louis Donelson, I believe. Governor Dunn almost felt that Lamar was like a son to him. I think it is remarkable that the one who probably above all others had Governor Dunn's personal and polical fortunes in mind was almost laughed off the playing field by that group of advisors. Here we were at the beginning of the first Republican administration in fifty years with a state government which others felt was full of Democrats and he was suggesting that the governor immediately recommend to the legislature putting all state agencies under civil service.

I might point out as well that there was universal agreement

among all people consulted that the Governor ought to proceed to fully implement during his term statewide kindergarten. In fact, that was done. There was almost full agreement that one of the major tenets of the administration ought to be reformed of the drug laws. Another area where there was almost full agreement was that the governor needed to reorganize the state's efforts at economic and community development. That is another matter that the governor ultimately did address.

Back to the final decision that the governor made about how to proceed with these priorities. The five primary areas of concern which he identifies in May of 1972 were: child development which encompassed not only kindergarten but child health and other programs impacting the development of children; penal reform; mental health services; drug abuse; and economic development. Anyone who has been a close reader of Dunn speeches from that time forward, will see that in the State of the State addresses and the Budget addresses and Budget Document itself and his legislative program the imprint of those conclusions about the five programs is very clear. He is probably most closely identified with the statewide kindergarten and perhaps the drug-abuse program,

DR. CRAWFORD: Would you go through the five again?

MR. BRADLEY: Yes. They were: Child development; penal reform as reform of the correctional system; mental health services; drug abuse and economic development. By economic development he clearly meant to define it much more broadly than traditionally has been defined as bringing in industries and getting jobs. It had to do with the quality of jobs and had to do with

the development of the basic emphasis structure of communities, sewage treatment, community facilities and many things other than traditional industrial development.

One of the major tasks of the Policy Planning staff for the rest of the administration was to work continuously with various departments affected by these program decisions to develop specific objectives within that. That is, how do you go about improving mental health facilities? For example, on that one, it was decided that it was passé to try to warehouse people in these large state institutions. We had moved toward decentralizing them--getting people out of these institutions into community facilites which the state would help fund and which communities would also have to fund. In fact, the budget for the Mental Health Department reflects that and the census in the mental health instutions even today, in 1977, reflects that.

I venture to guess that you won't find one mental health institution that has not greatly reduced its population since 1972 when Dunn made the decision to proceed with it.

THIS IS THE ORAL HISTORY RESEARCH OFFICE OF MEMPHIS STATE UNIVERSITY. THE PROJECT IS THE "ORAL HISTORY OF THE WINFIELD DUNN ADMINISTRATION." THE PLACE IS NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE AND THE DATE IS JUNE 8, 1977. THE INTERVIEW IS WITH MR. LEONARD K. BRADLEY. THE INTERVIEW IS BY DR. CHARLES W. CRAWFORD, DIRECTOR OF THE MEMPHIS STATE UNIVERSITY ORAL HISTORY RESEARCH OFFICE. TRANSCRIBED BY BETTY WILLIAMS. INTERVIEW # II.

DR. CRAWFORD: Mr. Bradley, before we get into the subject of the interview, I would like for the record to show that further information about priority areas will be included in written material which will be in your file as part of this oral history project.

MR. BRADLEY: Yes, I will forward that to you right away. I want to add one correction to my listing of the five priority areas. That is, a separate item should not have been included on drug abuse inasmuch as that was assumed as a mental health item. The fifth item should have been environmental protection, which had its major manifestation in the strip mining regulations and legislation and in the protection of certain wild or natural areas of the state and in the rationalization of our parks development program. With that, I think that will close out part of the statement concerning priority areas--goals and objectives. The remaining area in which I was closely involved and the last one I will deal with, concerns the conduct of the Dunn Administration's legislative affairs.

The first session of the General Assembly which Governor Dunn faced was in 1971 and I was involved only slightly in the legislative process during that session. At that time I was still director of the Office of Urban and Federal Affairs, having been appointed to that position by Dunn. During the 1971 session of the legislature, Roger Kesley of Dunn's staff coordinated the preparation of the administration's legislative program, and he had assistance from various other people--Lee Smith, Jim Caldwell, really were the chief lobbyists I suppose. As far as the substance of the legislation program goes, Roger Kesley worked with the state agencies and with the old Ellington transition team to put together that legislative program.

In that first year the Dunn administration had seventy-nine bills submitted to the legislature that Roger worked on. Only 7 of those bills were considered ready to bear the personal imprimatur of the governor. The others, for the most part, would have been bills that would have been submitted whether Ellington was governor or Hooker or whoever, because they were for the most part housekeeping measures--cleaning up tax laws, safety department laws, highway laws and so forth. But Roger handled the legislative program that first year.

By the time of the second session of the Dunn administration, of which there were four in all, this is the second session of the 87th General Assembly, the Policy Planning staff had been established and I headed it as an assistant to Dunn. One of the major aspects of our duties was to coordinate with the departments and the development of administration's legislative program. I might say at the outset that the

Dunn administration had decreasing success with the legislature throughout its term in passage of important priority legislation, which might have amounted to about 10% of our bills each year. In 1979 we passed 100% of our priority legislation--that was only 7 bills, but nevertheless that was 100% of them. In 1972 we passed 95%. We only did slightly less well. We had 22 priority bills that year and passed 21 of them. In 1973 we dropped down to 73% success rate on our priority legislation. That year we had 33 priority bills.

You can see as our tenure lengthened, we had less and less success. And as the number of bills and the complexity of our program grew, we had less and less success. We were proposing more sweeping changes. In 1974, the last year, only 35% of our priority legislation passed. That is, only 7 out of 20 bills passed. Overall, [regarding] our priority legislation during the administration, we passed 75% of our priority bills.

Considering all the administration legislation, that is for the four years, that is 345 bills. We passed 79% of or 274 bills. I really don't know how that compares to other administrations or to the Blanton administration.

But I do know, when out of curiosity, I asked Bo Roberts--who handled such matters--and Dick Barry in the Ellington administration as to whether they kept such records indicating their various successes, they said it really wasn't necessary. The governor got pretty much what he wanted out of the legislature back in those days until the late Ellington administration. The governor could be assured to

getting all the bills and all of his tax bills and all of his budget as submitted. There certainly was change during the Dunn Administration.

People I talked to about what seemed to think [that was] not entirely because it was the first Republican governor in fifty years and we had a heavily Democratic Legislature. Not that alone--but because about 1967-68 a great cleavage between the executive and legislative branch developed in Tennessee, and there were several manifestations of that. The development likely to some extent would have continued whether Dunn or Hooker were governor.

One overall comment I want to make about the history of the Dunn legislative experience is that the governor vetoed quite a few bills. Overall, during his four sessions he vetoed 70 bills and 14 of those were overridden. Very few of them were on partisan political matters such as redistricting of congressional seats or reapportionment of legislative seats--both of which were overturned--vetoes were overturned. But having 20% of your vetoes overturned is a rather high degree or high turnaround.

Again, looking at year by year gives some indication of the fact that executive/legislative relationships intensified as the years went on. Nineteen seventy-one he vetoed 9 and none were overturned. Nineteen seventy-two he vetoed 17 and two were overturned. Nineteen seventy-three he vetoed 22 and four were overturned. In 1974 he vetoed 22 and 8 were overturned. In fact, in 1974, his last legislative session, it was just like watching the dam break. He

began vetoing bills early in the session. By late in the session when some tempers had flared over medical school and 11-W some other matters of that sort someone pulled his finger out of the dike and all of a sudden on several successive days they started overturning vetoes.

And I remember one day in particular it seemed that about 4 vetoes were overturned just within a period of a few minutes. It was quite a show to see like the water pouring out of a dam that way.

I really would like to remark here about the way that the policy planning staff and the Dunn Administration tried to organize and control its legislative effort. The first year when Roger was handling it, we didn't have very many bills, as I said 79 overall, and most of those were really generated by problems that arose in the Ellington administration and were submitted by the governor as housekeeping measures. Only seven of them were really personally of interest to Dunn.

Of course, he knew and understood that he was going to have tremendous problems in his relations with the legislature, although his relationships with legislative leadership on a personal basis were extremely cordial all through his term except with Jim McKinney. I hesitate to say all through his term because McKinney was Speaker of the House during the 87th General Assembly and Governor Dunn's relationships with McKinny were extremely bad. There was just no respect between the two men. From the beginning Governor Dunn in the 87th, and later in the 88th Governor Dunn's relationship with

Lt. Governor Wilder, who was Speaker of the Senate, were extremely good. They had a great rapport and a great personal respect between the two of them. You could tell it was sincere. They both trusted each other.

When Ned McWherter was elected over Jim McKinney as Speaker of the 89th General Assembly Governor Dunn had good relationships with McWherter. They were perhaps more guarded because McWherter is a highly political animal, but nevertheless they had very good personal relationships and few problems arose between them. There were few things that Dunn and McWherter could not sit down and talk about.

But, at any rate, after that first term Dunn knew that it was time for them to really get to work with the Legislature. As part of the reorganization of the Office of Urban and Federal Affairs and the establishment of the policy planning staff it was determined that this [would be] staff of basically professional people--on the policy planning staff--one of whom was an environmental engineer, others of whom had training in law, political science and various disciplines. There were some law clerks, that is, law students who were working part time from Vanderbilt. The people on the policy planning staff, with a couple of exceptions, were not Republicans, Democrats or Whigs. They were just good people who were hired for their professional qualifications. Of course, they were on a policy planning staff which was closely tied to Dunn and which was sort of Dunn's policy [group] in effect or the administrator's or policy's headhunters. Therefore, although they were not political in a partisan

party sense, they were in the sense that they were trying to accomplish something amour to the political benefit of Winfield Dunn's Administration.

These people on Governor Dunn's Policy Planning staff, which I directed, worked with state agencies each year beginning in the summer in August to try to identify bills which each department would want to submit. What would happen would be, and this happened each year in August, '72, '73, '74, Governor Dunn would send a memorandum to all state agency heads under his jurisdiction--that is, those whom he appointed saying, "I want you to submit by September 15 or some such date to Leonard Bradley's office a brief description of all the bills you think you want to introduce in this next session of the General Assembly. Then we will talk about it."

So the department heads would submit such memoranda to my office. The people on my staff who were assigned to the various departments would go over those bills to be sure they understood them and they would try to identify problems with the bills--policy problems, political problems, budget problems. For instance if one bill would require a budget outlay of five million dollars, we would have to determine whether the money was available and whether one could do that. So we would work for a month or so with the departments to identify the bills that they would be allowed to proceed with.

We would brief Governor Dunn on the proposed program of each agency and we would tell him our conclusions and he would say, "Okay" you can tell Claude Armour, for instance, that we want him to prepare

these ten bills and we want him to forget these five. When I would convey that to Claude, I would tell him that the Governor's not trying to cut you out. If you feel strongly about any of these, go speak to the Governor about them. Maybe he will change his mind, and if he changes his mind of course, I, Leonard Bradley changed mine automatically.

That process worked remarkedly smoothly throughout the last three years of the administration. So that by the first of January or so, the departments would submit their bills to my office physically in jacketed form ready for introduction and we would go over them with the Governor, and with Commissioner of Finance and Administration, as far as the budget implications goes, with the administration floor leaders which first with the 87th General Assembly was Houston Goddard, who is now an Appeals Court Judge, and the 88th was Tom Garland and throughout the four years with Tom Jenson in the house, and with Lee Smith, with Jim Caldwell who was a part-time employee of the Governor's office. That is, he was the governor's lobbyist during the session and the rest of the time he ran his insurance business in Chattanooga.

We would go over the bills with those people and perhaps identify further problems, decide to change bills in certain ways or to decide to drop certain bills so that by the time the General Assembly convened in January or in 1973 they didn't get down to business until March, of course, because it was the first year of the assembly--88th. By that time we had the bills ready to introduce.

They would be farmed out by the floor leaders to various Republicans usually, or sometimes Democrats, for introduction. We would have some wrangling over policy matters with certain legislators. I recall the one which will illustrate the point. I guess the one that will illustrate the point best is Governor Dunn decided that he wanted some sort of tax relief program. He came up with the notion of introducing a circuit-breaker concept of tax relief, which was a back-door approach to an income tax of having people to pay taxes at the rate they were able to bear them.

This property tax rebate program, it was not solely a property tax but was to rebate property taxes and sales taxes to about 250,000 people in the state whose income was below a certain level. The program would have cost twelve and a half million dollars. The benefits would have averaged about $75.00 per person, that is for the 250,000 people. This concept is fairly well developed. It is not a new concept. It's something we consulted [about with] several tax professionals in universities and the Advisory Commission on Inter-governmental Relations and various tax experts. We consulted widely within the administration on it and some of the governor's advisors.

Lo and behold, when he presented it to the floor leaders the outcry among the Republican caucus in the Senate was very strong. They said in effect, and some of them outright, "That's the most un-Republican thing we have ever heard of! That's welfarism! That's a back-door approach to graduated income tax." And I cannot recall who did introduce it in the Senate. And someone, perhaps a Democrat,

introduced it in the House.

Leonard Dunavant introduced it just for the sake of getting it in. There was never any serious attempt to move the bill in either house. That was an example of where the Governor, although he had processed the legislation within the administration, ran headlong into the Republicans in each house and that kind of thing happened every now and then. Not on many bills but on a few. They would bring a bill to them and they would say, "We are just not going to take that. We aren't going to take the heat for it or we are not going to take that bill." In fact, I suspect if you ask some of the Republican leaders who are still in the General Assembly if they would have criticism of our legislative packaging process, our not having involved them in these discussions on the front end, I think is one lesson the Dunn Administration learned too late. It is something that would not be repeated again. If you are going to ask people like Tom Garland and Houston Goddard and Tom Jensen to take responsibility for trying to push a package through the General Assembly where they have got to take all the heat and they don't get much of the glory, they ought to be consulted on the front end and their views ought to be taken in account very heavily. I think it is very short-sided of us not to have done that. We would prepackage all of these bills--maybe a hundred bills--and say, "Boys, here it is, and we'd like for you to pass it for us." And that is right presumptuous of us to proceed in that way. I know some of them would quibble with us about the bills and some of the Republican

legislative leaders over the failure to be consulted on legislation and on budget and other matters.

After the legislation was introduced, the policy planning staff on a daily basis, or as the committees met, would attend every committee meeting and write up a report to the governor not only on how his bills were fairing in the committees, but also about bills of interest to him, whether he was for them or against them or were otherwise and not administration bills. We reviewed and wrote up comments on every bill introduced and would circulate these memos to the floor leaders--administration floor leaders--so they would know what the administration's position was on each bill. We call these memos "flags". We were trying to flag a bill to draw attention to it. In fact, it was well-known by Democrats and Republicans that we were doing this. Really the analyses that we prepared for these bills, I think, were very good, very competently done and done in consultation with the different departments. We would get affirmation from the departments and memos would go out over my signature to the floor leaders with copies to the governor, Lee Smith and Jim Caldwell, the governor's lobbyist. The memos would go directly to the administration floor leaders in each house. This was a daily process. We had memos going out at the rate of dozens every day. The floor leaders would organize them into little books and they would carry their big books to the committee meetings. Somebody might want to know from say, Tom Garland. "Say, Tom, do you have a flag on this bill." And as the sessions wore on and by the second year we had been involved

in doing this, Democrats and Republicans alike came to really trust our judgment on a lot of bills.

If we identify a certain administrator with a budget problem with a bill, they might be swayed by the administration position on that, rather a Republican position on that bill, even though the majority was Democratic. That is a process that was initiated in the Dunn Administration and that same kind of process for determining the administration's positions on bills is being used in the Blanton Administration.

In fact, Blanton's chief legislative handyman is Nelson Biddle--legislative aide. Nelson Biddle worked, not in a significant capacity in the Dunn Administration, but Nelson helped to develop this process of tracking and stating positions and determining positions on legislation. And it was from that that he has built on it and perhaps has improved it some, or perhaps not. Anyway he is using it in the Blanton Administration to track bills and to try to survey the administration's positions on bills.

Our relationship with state agencies, state departments, and the commissioners in the legislative process was a very difficult one. By that I do not mean it did not work well, but I just mean in that it was a very complex one. Here we had certain lobbyist working out of the governor's office, Lee Smith and me and Jim Caldwell and others, but we were not responsible for implementation of the programs. Of course, legislators wanted to know what Commissioner Armour thought about this, or Commissioner Smith or others

would think about certain bills. And it was very difficult to coordinate the development of administration position with those commissioners. I could just say that it worked very well and that there were very few snafus--very few times that the legislators were hearing two different stories from the administration.

We were very careful on the front end to coordinate those views and positions with the commissioner and 90% of the time the position that the administration--the governor and the policy planning staff--took on a piece of legislation was the view that the commissioner wanted pursuied. In fact, on any significant legislation, the view that the policy planning staff promulgated conveyed to the floor leaders was different from that of the commissioner, probably in most instances, had been worked out in some sort of meeting with the governor in which the commissioner had a full chance to air his views. He might be opposed to a bill that the governor's staff or the policy staff wanted to support or vice versa.

But we just didn't have many problems with commissioners running around the end and trying to privately contradict the positions that have been promulgated by the governor's office, whether it was by the Governor personally or by me or by Lee Smith or by Jim Caldwell.

For as complex a process as it takes to work out those kinds of things, it just worked remarkably smoothly. There were only three or four instances out of my three years involvement in that legislative process that come to mind where a problem developed between a commis-

sioner and me, or a commissioner and Lee Smith and it really flared up. I don't mean they flared up publicly, but they flared up privately.

I think on a whole, Dunn's approach to dealing with the Legislature, as far as processing of legislation goes, worked very well. I am really not competent to deal with the legislative relationships on budget. Those are matters that Ted Welch and Russell Hippe, the Commissioners of Finance and Administration would have to address, or Lee Smith the governor's executive assistant. But as far as the processing of non-budget legislation goes, it seemed to me it worked very smoothly. There are some things that could have been done to improve that. Primarily, I believe, consultation with the floor leaders prior to the development of the program. They could have headed off a lot of problems. I think they could have foreseen some of the problems that developed on the regional jail program, on paving of 11-W and the widening of 11-W, and on the medical school matter.

I've dealt in a fairly brief way and without dealing with specific legislative issues with the process--the processing of legislation. I'm prepared either now to have a written list here of some particularly important legislative issues that arose and how they were coped with. I can either read those into the record or provide those in written form.

DR. CRAWFORD: May we have them in written form to place in the Leonard Bradley file in

the Dunn Oral History Project.

MR. BRADLEY: Very well, I will give those to you in written form and let me say that they are taken from a legislative history of the Dunn administration that was compiled in loose-leaf form by the Policy Planning staff at the end of the Dunn administration. They amount simply to two or three page summaries for each session of the important issues which arose--most of them legislative issues, but some of them are policy issues other than legislation. For instance, the firing of E. C. Stimbert is noted here, although it has nothing to do with legislation. The undertaking of the cost-control study is mentioned here although it is not a legislative matter. I might caution you in your use of this material, which I will furnish, that this was prepared as an internal document for the Dunn Administration and a sort of self-gratification, and a copy was given to the Governor and to each Commissioner and to each member of the Governor's staff. It certainly is biased. It mentions the cost-control study with Maxey Jarman, but it does not go into the tremendous political problems that Dunn faced with that, the way it came back to haunt him.

DR. CRAWFORD: Do you remember when that report was prepared?

MR. BRADLEY: That report was prepared(the overall legislative report) was prepared late in 1974 and I don't have that date with me, but I will furnish you a copy of the memo from me to the Governor which introduces the report

and it will have the date on it. It was late 1974. It would have been following the 1974 session. Actually, it might not be that late, it was compiled in the summer time of 1974 after Dunn's last legislative session ended.

DR. CRAWFORD: I had recommended to him in either October or November of that year that he collect such reports from all parts for the preparing of a general history.

MR. BRADLEY: I don't know, Charles. Some other things were done a little later, which may be of interest to you although my office did not prepare them. Others whom you may consult may mention them. I believe that I have those with me. And I think one of them may have resulted from your discussion with him. Well, now I see here that this one is--no actually there is only one. There was a report issued in October of 1974 by Ralph Griffith, the press secretary, called "Accomplishments of the Dunn Administration". It is undated, but it was distributed on October 1, 1974. It outlines by department and in great detail increases in expenditures and the number of reduction of the census of the mental health institutions and so forth. It could have resulted from your discussions, I don't know that. If you wish I will furnish you with a copy as well.

DR. CRAWFORD: I may have one, but if you could it would be very helpful to have that in the files to be sure.

MR. BRADLEY: I will send that to you. I suppose since I am going to mail you a written report or summary of some of the most testy legislative issues that it won't be any need to pursue that aspect of this report further. I think really that that winds up what I really want to volunteer although you may have questions which I will be glad to pursue. But concerning my personal involvement, I did not know Governor Dunn until he was elected and came to know him during the transition from the Ellington to the Dunn administration. The first year of my involvement with him was as director of the Urban and Federal Affairs primarily in trying to access what ought to be done to reorganize staff services and management services within the governor's office. The last three years then, were involved in working with legislative matters, budget matters which were calculated to reach these predetermined objectives which the governor established in five different areas.

DR. CRAWFORD: I believe the report is remarkably complete, but let me ask your judgment as to why the number of vetoes increased as each legislative year went on and why do you believe that the percentage of legislative success declined?

MR. BRADLEY: I think part of it has to do with two aspects in any early administration probably, even though this was a Republican administration. I think there is a lot of good will. I think there is a sort of a "honeymoon"

period for a new governor or a new president. He comes in with actually a mandate of sorts, whether it is Blanton or Dunn or Ellington or whoever. Legislators are very cognizant of the fact that this man has just been elected by the people and that he is a very popular man in the state. And that is a political reality, and I think the "honeymoon" is based partly on that and partly on just wanting to give the guy a chance to grasp the reins firmly before stomping him. Partly too it is due to the fact that in the first year in the Dunn administration we hardly had any legislation or budget proposals that clearly were Dunn programs. They were fairly modest in the first year.

He was perhaps more concerned with the budget, with political appointments, with his political organization throughout the state and less interested in proposing vast legislative changes or vast legislative programs. They got 100%, but a 100% of what? He got 100% of 7 bills, in effect, which were of any great importance to him and the other 72 were for the most part were put together by the Ellington people who still at that time were in the department and who still are today perhaps. So his success there in the passage of 100% of important legislative programs was due partly to the "honeymoon" period and partly to the fact that he didn't really propose anything that bold or sweeping.

I believe I recall he vetoed 9 bills that first year. That's not very many bills to veto. And there were bills that he vetoed in the first year that primarily were due to their cost. The legislature at

the time was wrestling with a possible one-cent increase in the sales tax and under tremendous pressure to do it from the administration and under tremendous not to do it. Or at least they felt some pressure not to do it from back home. They were not much inclined to override bills that had been vetoed because of the cost--a half a million dollar cost or a million dollars or whatever.

Although I don't have a list of those vetoes with me, I think if you check you will find for the most part that they were bills that were expensive and were not really partisan matters or matters in which leading legislators has a strong personal interest. I believe that any executive's success with the legislature will diminish as the years go on. Ours took a pretty dramatic drop--and it is because in 1973 and 1974--we had some really important things that we wanted to do and some important fights on our hands. As the issues got bigger your chance of success--your opposition increases and chances for success diminish. I think that our lack of success in resisting the overriding vetoes and in securing passage of our bills in 1974 was all tied up in the fact that it was the end of a Republican governor's term. He had gotten or stumbled into some situations in upper East Tennessee--Republican stronghold--in which he had antagonized a lot of people.

The Democrats wanted to capitalize on that. Here were the people in upper East Tennessee, for instance, who finally had passed a bill that authorized the establishment of a medical school. Their own Republican governor had vetoed it. What better way for the Democrats

in an election year when they wanted to put a governor in office to capitalize on that then by overriding it and by saying:

> "Yes, you people in upper East Tennessee have been waiting for fifty years for a man to get into office to do something for you, and here he is and what is he doing for you? Well, he doesn't want to give you a medical school, he wants to give you a jail. He doesn't want to widen your principal highway. But we are telling you Republicans up there if you can't get it from your own, well, you can get it from us. And we are going to override that veto."

I think that is what happened.

There was so much trading off on the override of those of the veto of the 11-W funding and the medical school--there was so much trading off on unrelated bills that there was a lot of risk going on when they overrode those vetoes. If you'll vote to override this veto for me on this bill, I'll do the same for you on that other one. So that you have trade-outs on the override of the veto of a bill which repealed to modify the Missouri plan for appointment of Supreme Court judges. You had a lot of trade-outs like that. So perhaps the last year was more of a reflection of the end of the term and the advent of the political season than anything else.

The third year, that is 1973, it is hard to explain away. We got 72% of our major bills passed. There were, I think, four of twenty-two vetoes overriden in that year of 1973. That probably is not very bad. Four of twenty-two vetoes--twenty-two bills is a lot for a governor to veto. I think our experience is that the authority to veto a bill is somewhat finite. You sort of reach a point beyond which you don't go. You reach a point where it is almost like begging for a fight

with the legislature. I don't think we reached that point in 1973 because we only overrode 4 vetoes. I think we did reach it in 1974 though.

Overall the success rate of important legislation for the administration was 75%. At highest it was 100% in '71 and I will almost discount '71. I wouldn't discount '74. I think it would probably be fair to say that we ranged between 95% in '72 and 35% in '74. I really think that some of the Democratic legislative leaders, who have good recall and can remember some of those issues and certainly they would remember the political climate, would be better witnesses on that than I.

I think that any executive is going to start out high. The day you take office you are more popular--than you'll ever be again--if you won, you are. At the end of your term, you are the lamest of lame ducks going into your last legislative session. You are probably the least popular. So I think that the general axiom if it applies--if it is axiomatic--is one explanation for the decreasing success.

I really don't think I have that answer in total though. I think they finally realized that there was a Republican in office, and there was an election coming up, and they didn't want another one in office. I think that was a major determinor. I suspect for instance by comparison that if you were to look at Ray Blanton's success at the end of his term, you would see a definite downward trend in his success, but not as sharp a trend down. I'll be surprised if Blanton does as poorly in his last year as we did as far as passing important bills

goes.

DR. CRAWFORD: Thank you, Mr. Bradley.